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Abstract
Depression  has  been  associated  with  increased  response  times  at  the  incongruent,
neutral, and negative-word trials of the classical and emotional Stroop tasks (Epp et
al., 2012). Response time slow-down effects at incongruent and negative-word trials
of  the  Stroop tasks  were  reported  to  correlate  with  depressive  severity,  indicating
strong relevance of the effects to the symptomatology. The current study proposes a
novel integrative computational model of neural mechanisms of both the classical and
the  emotional  Stroop  effects,  drawing  on  the  previous  prominent  theoretical
explanations of performance at the classical Stroop task (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et
al.,  2006),  and  in  addition  suggesting  that  negative  emotional  words  represent
conditioned stimuli for future negative outcomes. The model is shown to explain the
classical  Stroop  effect  and  the  slow  (between-trial)  emotional  Stroop  effect  with
biologically-plausible  mechanisms,  providing  an  advantage  over  the  previous
theoretical  accounts  (Matthews and Harley,  1996;  Wyble  et  al.,  2008).  Simulation
results  suggested  a  candidate  mechanism responsible  for  the  pattern  of  depressive
performance  at  the  classical  and  the  emotional  Stroop tasks.  Hyperactivity  of  the
amygdala,  together  with  increased  inhibitory  influence  of  the  amygdala  over
dopaminergic neurotransmission, could be at the origin of the performance deficits.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Classical and emotional Stroop tasks are experimental paradigms which probe cognitive
control  in  the  face  of  conflicting  information  and  emotional  distraction  respectively.
Depression is associated with performance deficits at both tasks (Epp et al., 2012). In the
current study, we first set out to investigate the neural mechanisms underpinning the classical
and the emotional Soop effects, from a theoretical perspective. We then proceed to suggest
deficits in these mechanisms which might be characteristic of depression.
Classical Stroop Effect and Neural Mechanisms
The classical Stroop task requires the participants to name the ink-colour of the word,
where the verbal meaning of the word itself is either colour-congruent (e. g. 'Red' printed in
red ink), incongruent (e. g. 'Green' printed in red ink) or not relevant to the response (neutral,
e. g. 'Glass' printed in red ink). The hallmark Stroop effect manifests itself as the delay in
response when colour-naming incongruent combinations, compared to neutral combinations.
Quickest responses are observed to congruent stimuli. Slower responses in the incongruent
condition  indicate  an  added  cognitive  load.  As  a  result  the  task  has  been  used  for
investigating mechanisms of cognitive control (Cohen et al., 1990; MacLeod, 1991).
From a mechanistic  perspective,  arguably the  most  influential  model  of  the  classical
Stroop  effect  has  been  proposed  by  Cohen,  Dunbar  and  McClelland  (1990)  within  the
connectionist  Parallel  Distributed  Processing  (PDP)  framework.  The  model  posits  two
parallel competing neural pathways in the brain – one dedicated to processing colour and
another to processing words. Due to word reading behaviour being more frequently practiced
than colour naming, the word reading pathway is theorized as being over-trained compared to
the colour naming pathway. When the network performs the colour naming task, the word
reading  pathway  provides  strong  competition  due  to  its  automatic  habitual  nature.  To
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overcome  this  competition,  the  model  proposes  task-specific  facilitation  nodes,
corresponding  to  neural  representations  of  executive  control.  During  colour  naming,  the
active  colour-naming executive task-set  facilitates  the colour-naming processing  pathway,
which is then able to overcome the word-reading pathway competition and activate correct
responses.  The  executive  facilitation,  however,  is  not  strong  enough  to  compensate
completely  for  the  over-training  effects  within  the  word-reading pathway.  This  results  in
slower, although correct, performance at colour-naming, compared to word-reading (with the
strongest effect at the incongruent trials) – as has been reported experimentally. The Cohen et
al. (1990) model accounts successfully for the classical Stroop effect.
A notable extension of the PDP Stroop model has been proposed in Herd, Banich and
O'Reilly (2006), termed the Top-down Excitatory Bias (TEB) model of the Stroop effect. The
original account by Cohen et al. (1990) suggested long-range inhibitory connections between
the executive and the processing areas. These connections, however, appeared biologically
implausible. Banich et al. (2000) and Banich et al. (2001) have also revealed some rather
counter-intuitive  neuroimaging  results  related  to  the  classical  Stroop  task.  Specifically,
BOLD activations in verbal processing areas appeared higher in incongruent trials compared
to neutral trials. The original PDP model could not account for these findings. Herd et al.
(2006) have improved the model to exclude long-range inhibitory connections and include
representations  of  categories  (alongside  task  units),  responsible  for  facilitation  of  colour-
related information in all processing pathways. With the new colour category representation,
the model could account for the pattern of verbal area activations reported in Banich et al.
(2000, 2001).
Common neurobiological  interpretations  of  the  PDP and  TEB models  posit  that  the
DLPFC is responsible for maintaining representations of the task-set. This is supported by the
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experimental results (Nee et al., 2007). Parietal-cortical verbal and colour processing areas
are proposed to correspond to the colour and word processing pathways in the models (Cohen
et al., 1996; Herd et al., 2006).
Emotional Stroop Effect and Neural Mechanisms
The  emotional  Stroop  task,  in  contrast  to  the  classical  Stroop  task  utilizes  affective
(positive,  negative  or  neutral),  rather  than  colour  words,  with  the  similar  task  for  the
participants to name the colour of the ink. The main finding is that negative words, compared
to  positive  and  neutral  words,  cause  interference  with  task  performance,  measured  with
increased response times (e. g. McKenna and Sharma, 2004; Algom et al., 2004; Frings et al.
2010; review in Phaf and Kan, 2007). An important difference between the two tasks should
be noted: whereas ink colour and word meaning are designed to induce response conflict in
the classical task, no conflict is present in the emotional task. Instead, the response delay is
considered to arise due to the emotional relevance of the words. Whereas the classical Stroop
effect appears to be strongly manifested immediately, i.e. in the trials with ink-incongruent
colour words (MacLeod, 1991), the emotional Stroop effect appears to be expressed more in
a carry-over fashion, i.e. in the trials immediately following those with negative words (e. g.
McKenna and Sharma, 2004; Algom et al., 2004). A meta-analysis has shown that the effect
is  much more pronounced when negative-word trials  are  presented in blocks,  rather than
inter-mixed with neutral  words  (Phaf  and Kan, 2007).  This suggests that  negative words
induce a between-trial slow-down. The task has been useful for investigating the neural basis
of control over emotional interference (e. g. Compton et al., 2003), as well as disturbances in
anxiety  and  depression  (e.  g.  Gotlib  and  McCann,  1984;  Williams  et  al.,  1996;
Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008).
Compared to the classical Stroop effect, relatively few studies have looked at the neural
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basis of the emotional Stroop effect. Crucially, activation of the amygdala has been reported
in  generation  of  the  effect  (Isenberg  et  al.,  1999).  Lack  of  behavioural  slow-downs  at
negative-word trials, on the other hand, was accompanied by activation of the DLPFC, and
deactivation  of  the  amygdala  (Compton et  al.,  2003).  Activated  amygdala  has  also  been
highlighted  at  other  tasks  during  emotional  word  processing  (Hamann  and  Mao,  2002;
Naccache et al., 2005; Straube et al., 2011), and during emotional distraction at executive and
attention tasks (review in Iordan et al., 2013). In the latter case, amygdala appeared activated
together with ventral  prefrontal cortex,  and accompanied by deactivation of the executive
control  areas  including  the  DLFPC.  Apart  from  the  amygdala,  several  studies  reported
activations of the rostral anterior cingluate cortex (rACC, Whalen et al., 1998; Mohanty et al.,
2007).
Compared to the classical Stroop task, only a single computational modelling study to
date accounts for the mechanistic basis of the  slow emotional Stroop effect.  Wyble et al.
(2008)  expand  on  the  earlier  conflict  resolution  account  by  Botvinick  and  colleagues
(Botvinick  et  al.,  2001;  Yeung  et  al.,  2004).  They  suggest  that  automatic  processing  of
negative emotional words results in decreased deployment of attentional / cognitive control
necessary for the ongoing task. This should release resources for preparing to locate and
process  a  potential  threat,  and  lead  to  a  delay  in  colour-naming  after  negative  words,
corresponding to the slow emotional Stroop effect. As in the previous modelling studies, the
authors suggest that the cognitive control node might correspond to the dACC. The authors
further suggest that the rACC could be recruited when processing negative or threatening
material,  with  a  specific  role  to  inhibit  the  dACC and reduce  task-related  attention.  The
model is consistent with evidence of involvement of the rACC in generating the emotional
Stroop effect (Whalen et  al.,  1998; Bush et al.,  2000). It also accounts well  for the slow
emotional  Stroop  effect  (McKenna  and  Sharma,  2004;  Algom  et  al.,  2004).  The
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neurobiological interpretation of the model, however, remains controversial. Mohanty et al.,
(2007),  for  example,  reported  correlating  activations  in  the  rACC and the  dACC during
performance  at  the  emotional  Stroop task,  which  contradicts  the  competition  hypothesis.
Etkin et al. (2006) and Egner et al. (2008) reported an inhibitory effect of the rACC activation
over the subsequent amygdala activity, in a face-word version of the task. This suggests that
the rACC is involved in diminishing bottom-up propagation of emotional information – a
theory opposite to Wyble et al. (2008).
Depressive Classical and Emotional Stroop Effects
Depression is a prevalent psychiatric disorder characterized by a range of affective and
cognitive  symptoms,  including  persistent  sad  mood  or  depressive  ruminative  thought,
diminished ability to concentrate, and diminished ability to make decisions (Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A recent meta-analysis has
indicated a robust effect of depression on performance in the classical, and the emotional
Stroop tasks (Epp et al., 2012). The authors reviewed 47 studies and reported that depression
is  robustly  associated  with  higher  colour-naming  response  times  in  all  except  congruent
conditions,  with  negatively  valenced  words  being  associated  with  the  strongest  effect,
compared  to  neutral  and  positive  words.  Significantly  stronger  interference  (depression
compared to controls) was also found in the incongruent condition of the classical Stroop
task. Results are consistent with a previous meta-analysis of attentional bias in depression
(Peckham et  al.,  2010).  Most  notably,  Epp and colleagues  have  discovered  a  correlation
between depressive symptom severity (HAM-D scores) and depression effect sizes at  the
negative and incongruent Stroop task conditions. This suggests that changes in the Stroop
performance in depression, particularly in association with negatively valenced stimuli, could
be relevant to the symptomatology of the disorder.
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Only few studies to date have investigated the neural basis of altered performance at the
classical Stroop task in depression. One fMRI study indicated increased activations in the
rACC and the DLPFC in unmedicated depressed patients (Wagner et al., 2006). In contrast,
decreased activations in many brain regions – including the middle frontal  gyrus and the
posterior cortex – were reported at incongruent condition in another study (Kikuchi et al.,
2012).  In both cases, however,  no behavioural differences between depressed and control
participants were observed. When increased response times and error rates  were observed,
they were reported to correlate with decreased activations in small regions of the DLPFC and
the dACC (Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008). Overall, these results indicate that lower activation
in the prefrontal regions (including the DLPFC) might contribute to slower performance in
the classical Stroop task, while over-activation of these region might represent compensatory
activity.
With  regard  to  the  neural  correlates  of  the  emotional Stroop  task  performance  in
depression, only a single fMRI study appears to have been conducted to date. Results indicate
hyperactivity in the rACC and in the precuneus, with the rACC hyperactivation positively
correlating with the negative-word trial response latencies (Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008).
The authors did not find stronger activation of the amygdala (reported to be hyperactive in
depression, Whalen et al., 2002; Drevets, 2003; Hamilton et al., 2012). Drawing on Etkin et
al.,  (2006),  Mitterschiffthaler  et  al.  (2008)  suggested  that  the  rACC  could  act  as  a
compensatory mechanism – to inhibit lower-level emotional processing in the amygdala. If
this is the case, the hyperactive rACC would not contribute directly to the behavioural effects
of depression at the emotional Stroop task.
Depression Neurobiology
General neurobiology of depression has been the subject of several important theoretical
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reviews over  the last  decades.  Mayberg (1997) proposed an influential  depression model
emphasizing  increases  in  ventral  limbic  area  activations  (amygdala,  hippocampus,
hypothalamus),  alongside  an  activity  decrease  in  dorsal  neocortical  (dACC and DLPFC)
areas. These neural alterations arguably correspond to increased negative conditioned and
affective  processing  (mood  symptoms)  and  decreased  task-related  cognitive  control
(cognitive symptoms). DeRubeis et al. (2008) have suggested an imbalance in the interactions
between  the  amygdala  and  the  PFC as  a  hallmark  abnormality  in  depression  (with  the
amygdala exerting a stronger influence over the PFC), which is ameliorated with successful
treatment. Disner and colleagues related depressive neural deficits to components of Beck's
influential cognitive model and suggested amygdalar hyperactivity as the crucial contributing
factor to negatively-biased information processing in attention,  memory and interpretation
(Beck,  1967;  Disner  et  al.,  2011).  The  dACC  and  the  DLPFC  are,  on  the  other  hand,
suggested  as  hypoactive  –  exerting  reduced modulating  control  over  the  limbic  affective
processing. In line with these suggestions, Roiser and Sahakian (2013) have also proposed a
novel cognitive neuropsychological model of depression, stressing deficient cognitive control
from the DLPFC and increased negative emotional bias in the amygdala, and other limbic
areas, as some of the core depressive neural abnormalities.  A general consensus between
these theoretical reviews is that limbic affective areas – most notably the amygdala – become
metabolically hyperactive in depression, while dorsal cortical areas responsible for higher
cognition become hypoactive.
A  wealth  of  evidence  indicates  deficiency  in  monoamine  neurotransmission  in
depression, with particular importance of serotonin (Mulinari, 2012; Blier and El Mansari,
2013).  Evidence from the last  two decades,  however,  also indicates  an important  role  of
dopamine in the disorder. Animal models of depression, for example, have been characterized
by reduced dopaminergic neurotransmission, particularly in the mesolimbic pathway (Cabib
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& Puglisi-Allegra,  1996;  Gessa,  1996).  Pharmacological  agents  which increase dopamine
levels  (bupropion  and  amineptine)  are  currently  used  as  a  second-line  treatment  for
depression with some degree of success (Rampello et al., 2000; IsHak et al., 2009; Shultz and
Malone, 2013). Recent reviews highlight that dopamine transmission alterations are highly
relevant  to  the  depressive  symptomatology  (Nestler  and  Carlezon,  2006;  Dunlop  and
Nemeroff, 2007; Pizzagalli, 2014). In summary, although serotonin has historically received
the most attention in depression, emerging evidence also indicates deficits in dopaminergic
neurotransmission.
In the current study, we will consider involvement of the amygdala and the dopamine
system in  the  generation  of  the  emotional  Stroop  effect.  We  will  return  to  the  relevant
neurobiological deficits overviewed above when we constrain the possible mechanisms of
depression in the theory and methods section below.
Modelling Aims
Our first aim is to attempt to better explain the neural mechanisms involved in generating
the emotional Stroop effects, within an integrative model of both the classical and emotional
Stroop tasks. Previous account suggests that the slow effect arises due to reduced deployment
of cognitive control  (Wyble et  al.,  2008).  Its  neurobiological  interpretation – competition
between dACC and rACC – remains controversial (e. g. Etkin et al., 2006; Mohanty et al.,
2007).  The  current  modelling  study  aims  to  provide  a  better  biologically-grounded
explanation of the effect drawing on the novel interpretation of emotional words as a case of
conditioned stimuli. It is suggested that neural mechanisms of conditioned stimuli processing
could be responsible for generating the slow emotional Stroop effect.
Our second aim is to investigate mechanisms of the increased response times at both the
classical  and  emotional  Stroop  tasks  in  depression.  Increases in  response  times  at
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incongruent and  negative trials  correlate  with  symptom  severity  (Epp  et  al.,  2012).
Explanation of neural mechanisms of these deficits can thus indicate core mechanisms of
depression (Maia et al. 2011).
THEORY AND MODELLING METHODS
Conditioned Task-set Competition Theory
The current study constructs a novel integrative model of the classical and emotional
Stroop  effects,  following  the  principles  outlined  in  Cohen  et  al.  (1990).  We  expand  the
original model with additional biologically-based components to account for the emotional
Stroop effect, following interpretation of the emotional words as conditioned stimuli. Briefly,
the novel suggestion is that mechanisms of conditioned information appraisal in the brain
also generate the emotional Stroop reaction time effects.
Classical  (Pavlovian)  conditioning refers  to  the  ability  to  learn  associations  between
neutral stimuli and motivationally salient events – rewards and punishments. The previously-
neutral  stimuli  predicting  (associated  with)  rewards  or  punishments  are  referred  to  as
conditioned  stimuli  (CS),  while  the  primary  rewards  or  punishments  are  referred  to  as
unconditioned stimuli (US). In brief, classical conditioning refers to the ability to learn to
evoke behaviours relevant to the US (rewards or punishments) upon a mere presentation of
the CS – even when the US is not present. Positive and negative words at the emotional
Stroop task could be considered a type of CS due to their primary or secondary associations
with motivationally salient concepts or events – rewards or punishments.
Expression of conditioned behaviours  is  crucially mediated by the amygdala.  This  is
supported  by  the  wealth  of  rodent  studies  indicating  criticality  of  the  structure  for  both
learning,  long-term  storage  and  expression  of  conditioned  fear  (CS  -  US)  associations
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through the neural mechanism of long-term potentiation (LeDoux, 2003; Phelps and LeDoux,
2005; Maren, 2005). Functional neuroimaging and lesion studies have also supported the role
of the amygdala in the expression of fear in humans (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Phelps,
2006).  Drawing  this  existing  evidence,  in  our  model  the  amygdala  acts  as  the  primary
detector of conditioned material – affective words. It then sends signals to other brain areas to
initiate relevant conditioned behaviours.
Alongside the amygdala, a critical role in conditioned behaviour expression has been
reported for regions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). More specifically, the medial prefrontal
cortex  (MPFC,  encompassing  the  rACC)  is  considered  to  be  involved  in  behavioural
expression of conditioned fear, as well as acquisition of fear extinction memories (Courtin et
al., 2013; Maroun, 2013; Marek et al., 2013). Both the MPFC and the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC, located caudally to the MPFC) have been suggested to evaluate conditioned stimulus
signals  from the  amygdala  in  order  to  select  and  initiate  most  appropriate  instrumental
responses (Cardinal et al., 2002; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). This is consistent with strong
structural interconnections of the regions with the amygdala (Carmichael and Price, 1995;
Ray  and  Zald,  2012).  Drawing  on  this  evidence,  we  suggest  that  amygdala  conditioned
stimulus signals (initiated by emotional words) are propagated to the areas in the PFC, where
they support representations of behaviours (task-sets) relevant for the conditioned material (e.
g.  escape  behaviour  in  response to  a  threat  word).  These  conditioned representations  are
suggested to draw resources away from the current ongoing behaviours (task-sets).
Complementary  evidence  also  implicates  involvement  of  the  dopamine  system  in
conditioned behaviour expression. Dopaminergic burst activity in the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) is theorised to represent reward-prediction error signals in the brain (Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010; Lammel et al., 2014). Symmetric to dopaminergic bursts (spikes) – short phasic
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decreases (dips) in dopamine neuron firing may be characteristic of processing punishments,
and  conditioned  stimuli  predictive  of  punishments  (particularly  those  which  are
uncontrollable) (reviews in Oleson and Cheer, 2013; Volman et al., 2013). Conditioned dips
in firing of the VTA dopamine neurons are likely triggered by inhibitory signals from the
immediately-posterior rostromedial tegmental area (RMTg) (reviewed in Bourdy and Barrot,
2012).  The  RMTg  itself  receives  signals  from  a  wide  range  of  subcortical  structures
including,  among  others,  the  extended  amygdala.  A recent  optogenetic  investigation  has
indicated that  signals  from the extended amygdala to  the  RMTg are sufficient  to  initiate
aversion-related behaviours (Jennings et al., 2013). Drawing on this evidence, we suggest that
negative  words  in  the  emotional  Stroop  task  are  detected  as  conditioned  stimuli  by  the
amygdala,  which triggers  dopamine  dip signals  in the VTA. Dopamine signals  propagate
widely in the brain, with the PFC as a major target. Dopamine levels in the PFC have been
proposed  to  promote  cognitive  stability  (stability  of  the  task-set),  while  decreases  in
dopamine levels  should enable flexible  shifts  of  the cognitive  tasks  (Cools  et  al.,  2008).
Drawing on this theory, we suggest that the amygdala-initiated dopamine dips are propagated
to  the  PFC,  where  they  decrease  D1  receptor  occupancy  (Dreyer  et  al.,  2010),  which
subsequently decreases stability of the current task-set. This is suggested to enable better
processing of the incoming conditioned negative material.
Importantly, dopamine is transmitted to the PFC largely through volume diffusion, rather
than directly to synapses (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Lapish et al., 2007). Stable levels of
prefrontal  dopamine are defined mainly (though not exclusively)  by the balance between
dopamine release and uptake. Decreased transmission from the VTA to the PFC (dopamine
dips)  should  result  in  a  transient  dominance  of  uptake  over  release,  and  thus  decreased
dopamine occupancy at the receptor sites (Dreyer et al., 2010). Dopamine uptake in the PFC,
however, has been shown to be relatively slow, with a time-course between one and tens of
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seconds (Garris and Wightman, 1994; Wayment et al., 2001; Seamans and Yang, 2004). This
means that although the dips are fast to reach the PFC, their destabilising effects would be
slower, and might only have an effect after a short delay. We suggest that the slow nature of
the dopamine dip effects over the PFC might contribute to a delay between presentation of
negatively conditioned stimuli and the following behavioural reaction.
To  summarize,  in  the  constructed  model,  information  from  negatively-valenced
emotional (conditioned) cues is propagated through affective areas (amygdala and the VTA)
to higher cortical areas (PFC). This propagation induces a shift of the task-set from the one
currently imposed towards a different one that is more relevant to the conditioned stimulus.
The induced competition between the current and the new tasks results in reduced activation
of  the enabled task representation (word-reading or  colour-naming).  This  leads  to  slower
processing  of  task-relevant  stimuli  and  thus  to  slower  responses,  corresponding  to  the
emotional Stroop effect. Importantly, because dopamine dips are slow to take effect in the
PFC, task-set competition is only considered enabled between two consecutive trials, rather
than  immediately.  This  leads  to  the  between-trial  slow-downs  as  has  been  reported
experimentally (Phaf and Kan, 2007). Since the conditioned stimulus-induced competition in
the cognitive task-set is the principal idea of the model, we term the model the Conditioned
Task-set  Competition (CTC) account  of the emotional  Stroop effect.  A description of  the
computational principles used in the study follows, with a detailed description of the model
architecture and specification of model parameters.
Modelling Methods and Architecture
Modelling Principles
We follow the  connectionist  principles  of  Cohen et  al.  (1990) (and extensions,  e.  g.
Botvinick et  al.,  2001; Wyble et  al.,  2008).  In brief,  each unit  in the model represents a
Neural Mechanisms of Emotional Interference in Depression  14
population  of  neurons  in  the  brain,  characterised  by  a  level  of  activation.  The  units  are
interconnected between each other, which roughly corresponds to (direct or indirect) white
matter projections between neuron populations. Connection strengths from each unit mediate
how much the unit's output influences activations of other units.
Each unit's activation is the running average of its inputs:
ai , t = ai , t−1(1 − τ) + ii , t τ   (1)
Here a i , t  is activation of unit i at time t; ii ,t  is the total input to unit i at time t; and τ
is the activation time constant.
Each unit's activation is modelled to be always close to or above zero (set to zero in case
of a negative value). Each unit's complete input is the sum of weighted outputs of all units
with incoming connections, together with the unit activation bias (external input in a trial):
ii ,t = ∑
j
o j ,t w j , i + bi   (2)
Here o j , t  - output from unit j at time t; b i  - bias / external input to unit i at current trial;
w j ,i  - connection strength from unit j to unit i.
Finally, each unit's output is computed as its sigmoid-transformed activation:
o j ,t =
1
1 + e−γi (Sai , t−1 − θ)
− d   (3)
In the above equation d = 1
1 + eγ iθ
 is the term used to force unit output to zero when
unit  activation is zero; and  γi , θ , S  -  unit  i  output function parameters ( γi  is different
between the processing, conditioned and task-set layers).
During the course of a trial, unit activations are repeatedly updated until one of the units
in the response layer achieves a pre-specified threshold. The response is then considered to be
Neural Mechanisms of Emotional Interference in Depression  15
achieved.  This  is  a  simplification from the original  response mechanism of  Cohen et  al.
(1990), which was based on evidence accumulation. Similarly simpler response mechanisms
have been used successfully in other models (e. g. Yeung et al. 2004, Wyble et al., 2008). The
number of update cycles of the unit activations is taken as representative of the trial response
time. To relate the number of update cycles ( RT cycles ) to a response time in milliseconds
( RT ms ), the cycle numbers are translated in the following way:
RT ms = RT cycles∗K+ I    (4)
Here K is the regression parameter (how many cycles correspond to a millisecond?) and
I  is the intercept parameter (how much time does it take for stimulus preprocessing and for
response execution outside of the model?).
Response  errors  and  variability  in  response  times  between  trials  have  not  been
considered. Hence performance of the constructed model is deterministic – no unit activation
noise is included. This was also the case in the previous modelling account (Wyble et al.,
2008).
Critically,  the  γ  parameters above are representative of the gains of the unit  output
functions, such that higher  γ  parameter values result in sharper unit outputs. A higher  γ
value results in a sharp increase in the output when unit activation reaches a certain threshold.
Lower values of the γ  parameter result in a more linear relationship between the activation
and output, with lower maximal output of the unit.  An illustration of the effect of the  γ
parameter  over  the  unit  output  function  can  be  found  in  Appendix  I.  A  prominent
neurobiological  interpretation  of  the  gain  ( γ )  parameter  for  PFC has  been proposed by
Servan-Schreiber  et  al.  (1990),  suggesting  relevance  to  the  levels  of  catecholamines  (in
particular dopamine) effective over the activated units. This interpretation has been expanded
upon and applied to explain dopaminergic deficiency aspects of schizophrenia in relation to
Neural Mechanisms of Emotional Interference in Depression  16
cognitive deficits in the disorder (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1993; Servan-Schreiber et al.,
1998; Braver et al., 1999). Recent neurophysiological evidence supports this interpretation of
the dopamine effects over prefrontal neurons, specifically through D1 receptors (Thurley et
al., 2008). Drawing on these theoretical considerations, the γT  (gain) parameter of the task-
set (PFC) units has been taken as representative of the levels of dopamine in the PFC in effect
at D1 receptors in the current study.
Dopamine level in the PFC (gain of the task-set units,  γT ) is computed basing on the
output levels of dopamine midbrain cells (VTA, represented by the reinforcement unit PR in
the model):
γT = γTmin + rT oR  (5)
Here γTmin  represents the minimal output gain of the PFC units when no dopaminergic
input  is  present,  rT  is  a  dopamine-level  scale  parameter,  and  oR  is  the  output  of  the
reinforcement unit (PR) at the end of the preceding trial. To simulate the slow time-course of
dopamine effects over the PFC,  γT  is only updated between every two consecutive trials,
and fixed during the course of a single trial.
Model Architecture
The constructed model consists primarily of the two competing pathways for processing
colours and words from preprocessed perceptual to response selection stages – as in the other
models of the classical Stroop effect. The word-reading pathway (Figure 1,  IPw and  PRw
connections)  is  stronger  than  the  colour-naming  pathway  (Figure  1,  IPc and  PRc
connections). The processing priority is imposed by the task-set activation (Tc or  Tw unit),
which supports activations in either the word-reading, or in the colour-naming pathway, to
enable successful completion of the current task. Units within the classification, response and
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task-set layers have inhibitory connections between each other.
The classical Stroop effect is explained by a combination of mechanisms proposed in the
model by Cohen et al., (1990) and its further extension (Herd et al., 2006). Colour-neutral and
colour-incongruent words induce strong interference when the network identifies the colour,
due to the stronger word-processing pathway connections. This results in slower responses at
both neutral and incongruent conditions, compared to congruent. During  incongruent trials,
the  colour-naming  task  unit  further  facilitates  all  colour-word  units (through  TcPw
connection). This increases response competition compared to neutral trials and results in the
highest slow-down at the incongruent condition – corresponding to the Stroop effect. This
mechanism is similar to the account of Herd et al. (2006), where the colour-concept unit plays
the role similar to the TcPw connection in the current model. Overall, the input, processing,
response and task-set layers, and connections between them (Figure 1) are responsible for the
classical Stroop effect, similarly to the previous accounts (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et al.,
2006).
The  third  pathway  is  representative  of  processing  conditioned  stimuli.  The  pathway
consists of two components: 1) Dopaminergic control of the task-set unit outputs (IWn – PEn
– PR – Tc / Tw / Tn pathway); and 2) Conditioned information propagation to the task-set in
the PFC (IWn – PEn – Tn pathway). The PEn conditioned processing unit in the pathways is
suggested to  correspond to the amygdala.  This  unit  in  the model  is  only activated when
processing negative  words  (IWn  input  unit  active),  but  completely inactive  otherwise for
healthy  controls.  When  activated,  the  unit  exerts  inhibitory  control  over  the  VTA-
representative reinforcement unit  PR,  through connection Per. Inhibition of the  PR unit is
suggested  to  correspond  to  dopaminergic  decrease  signals  (likely  mediated  by  the
intermediary RMTg structure). These dopamine signals propagate to the PFC (Tc,  Tw,  Tn
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units, connection Rt) and reduce output levels of those task-set units which are highly active –
in  order  to  facilitate  competition  (Equation  5,  Appendix  I).  The  negative  task  /  concept
representation in the PFC – Tn unit – then receives direct support from the PEn unit through
connection PTe. This initiates competition between the task-set representations – Tc and Tw
units against the  Tn unit. The two mechanisms – dopamine level decrease and competition
between tasks – contribute to decreased influence of the current task-set over behaviour, and
thus slower responses when negative emotional cues are present. Overall,  the conditioned
processing (IWn –  PEn –  Tn) and the reinforcement  (IWn –  PEn –  PR – Tc /  Tw /  Tn)
pathways are responsible for the emotional Stroop effect.
It should be noted that during the course of a single negative-word trial, dopamine in the
PFC ( γT )  stays  at  the  same  relatively  high  level  due  to  the  slow course  of  dopamine
reuptake.  Although the  Tn negative concept unit  receives conditioned information signals
from the amygdala (PEn unit), it cannot become activated because of the high output of the
active task-set (Tc or Tw unit, Appendix I), and strong lateral inhibition. The same principle of
high neural-gain mediated  inhibition has  been shown to  focus  information processing on
highly-representative or important features, and to limit learning (Eldar et al., 2013). Between
two sequential trials, dopamine dip takes effect in the PFC, reducing the  γT  neural gain.
Activations of units in the task-set (Tc, Tw and Tn), as well as the conditioned pathway units
(PEn  and PR), are carried over from the previous trial, mimicking a form of rudimentary
working memory. Because of the lower neural gain, Tn unit is then able to become activated
and to compete with the other task-set units.  Both the reduced neural gain ( γT ) and the
activated competing negative concept (Tn unit) decrease outputs of the highly active task-set
units – Tc and Tw. This results in a delayed response in the trial following the negative-word
presentation, accounting for the slow between-trial nature of the emotional Stroop effect.
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Model Constraints and Specification
Performance  constraints  for  the  model  were  following.  The  model  crucially  had  to
produce  correct  responses  at  both  colour-naming  and  word-reading  tasks  with  colour
(congruent and incongruent), neutral, and negative emotional words. For the classical Stroop
task, the model was aimed to reproduce response times from the hallmark study of Dunbar
and MacLeod (1984) Experiment 2, as in the previous connectionist accounts (Cohen et al.,
1990; Herd et al.,  2006; Wyble et al.,  2008). For the emotional Stroop task, performance
constraints were taken from McKenna and Sharma (2004), Experiment 3, and Algom et al.
(2004), Experiment 2. In McKenna and Sharma (2004), a single negative word initiated a
between-trial effect when presented in sequence with neutral words. Algom et al. (2004) have
shown that the emotional slow-down predominantly occurs in blocks of trials, at both colour-
naming and word-reading tasks. We selected these three datasets because they are highly
representative of the classical and emotional Stroop reaction-time slow-downs. Accounting
for these signatures enables a further investigation of deficits responsible for the effects of
depression on reaction times. We describe below how the model parameters were specified
and outline how the selected datasets were applied to constrain parameter values.
The constructed model has nine activation parameters – four input biases, one unit time-
constant, three output gain parameters, and one response threshold. These parameters were all
fixed to either biologically or functionally reasonable values prior to the simulations and are
described in Appendix I.
Apart from the activation parameters, the model contains twelve connection parameters
(Table A2). Three are responsible for the main processing pathway connections (IPc, PRc,
TS), another four are responsible for task-set facilitation of the processing and response units
(TcP, TcPw, TwP, TwR), one responsible for lateral inhibition between layer units (Li), and
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another four for task-set reinforcement and negative conditioned stimulus processing (IPe,
PTe, Per, r T ). We describe specification of these parameters below.
First of all, the r T  connection represents dopaminergic fibers from the VTA to the PFC
and was specified to enable a high neural gain of the task-set units when the reinforcement
unit is highly active (with r T = 8  and the fixed activation parameters,  γT  is close to the
value of 8, Equation 5, Figure A1). This represents relatively strong dopaminergic innervation
of the PFC when performing a task. The lateral inhibitory connection strength (Li) was set to
a relatively high value of 0.8 – this means that once one unit is highly active within a layer,
any competing unit must receive an input higher than 0.8 in order to produce any output.
Together with a sufficiently high neural gain, this warrants strong lateral inhibition within
layers. The  PRc  connection strength was tied to the response threshold (Appendix I) and
specified to the value of 0.8. This connection was set to be sufficiently strong so that the
maximal output of a processing unit could warrant its relevant response unit  to cross the
threshold and generate a response. The IPc and TS parameters concluded parametrization of
the processing connections and were specified to sufficiently low values so that the model
could not generate a response (cross the response threshold) without an active task-set unit
(IPc = 0.5 and TS = 1.2, note that the TS parameter represents the training scale parameter
and has to be above one, Table A2).
We then explored and specified the four task-to-processing connections (TcP, TcPw, TwP,
TwR) to replicate the classical Stroop effect. Specifically, the TcP and TcPw connections were
set to replicate highest colour-naming reaction times at the incongruent condition, followed
by neutral condition, and followed by congruent condition. TwP connection was specified to
be  strong  enough  to  replicate  approximately  equal  reaction  times  between  the  three
conditions at the word-reading task. Strong TwP connection on its own could not account for
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the fast reaction times at the word-reading task. We hence added a connection from the word-
reading task (Tw) unit to the response units (Rr, Rg, Ro, connection TwR). This is in line with
the notion that the word-reading task is highly practiced and potentiates response activations
when  active.  These  four  task-set  connection  strengths  were  then  manually  tuned  to  best
replicate  twelve performance constraints:  six  reaction  times  (three  for  colour-naming and
three  for  word-reading),  and six related  response  correctness  measures  from Dunbar  and
MacLeod, 1984, Experiment 2.
We finally specified the three remaining conditioned pathway connections (IPe,  PTe,
Per). IPe and PTe connection strengths were set to the value tied to the input bias of the task-
set units (IPe  = PTe =  1 since Tb  is fixed to one, Appendix I).  This means that when a
conditioned input is present (IWn unit active), its signal is propagated to the negative concept
(Tn) unit in the task-set, with the strength that matches input of the active task unit. This is
considered to represent strong conditioned-stimulus neural signals from the amygdala to the
PFC  which  should  enable  lateral  competition.  Without  the  Per  connection,  however,
conditioned signals are propagated to the PFC but cannot activate the  Tn negative concept
unit due to lateral inhibition. The Per  connection strength was finally specified to replicate
the  emotional Stroop effects. Specifically, it was selected to best replicate  three slow-down
effects with negative words: the between-trial  slow-down when a single negative word is
presented in a sequence with neutral words (McKenna and Sharma 2004, Experiment 3), and
the  two slow-down effects  when  negative  words  are  presented  in  trial  blocks  at  colour-
naming and at word-reading tasks (Algom et al., 2004, Experiment 2). Additional constraint
came from the fact that the model had to produce correct responses with negative words,
despite the task-set destabilisation.
Overall, seventeen behavioural performance data points were applied – six reaction times
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and six response correctness measures at the classical Stroop task (Dunbar and MacLeod,
1984, Experiment 2), three negative-word slow-down effects (McKenna and Sharma 2004,
Experiment  3;  Algom et  al.,  2004,  Experiment  2)  and  another  two  response  correctness
measures – when negative words  are  presented in  blocks  at  colour-naming and at  word-
reading tasks. The resulting set of connection parameter values can be found in Table A3.
Depression Modelling
The second main aim of the current  study was to  investigate the mechanisms of the
increased  response  times  and  the  emotional  Stroop  effect  in  depression.  To  this  end,
following the principles of computational psychiatric modelling (Maia and Frank, 2011), we
have investigated alterations in the constrained model. Two main criteria have been applied to
identify plausible depression mechanisms. First, the alterations had to reproduce the reported
behavioural deficits – increased response times in negative, incongruent and neutral  trials
(Epp  et  al.,  2012).  Second,  the  alterations  were  constrained  to  be  relevant  to  the  most
prominent  reported neural  abnormalities  in  depression.  A more detailed discussion of  the
second constraint is as follows.
First, significant neuroimaging evidence indicates alterations in the amygdala as one of
the key features of depressive disorder (e. g. Whalen et al., 2002; Drevets, 2003). A recent
meta-analysis  of  neuroimaging  studies  strongly  supported  amygdala  hyperactivation  in
response to negative affective stimuli (Hamilton et al., 2012). Higher depressive amygdala
activity  has  also  been  observed  specifically  in  response  to  conditioned cues  predicting
occurrence of aversive pictures (Abler et al.,  2007). These results indicate stronger neural
processing  of  negatively-valenced conditioned information  in  the  amygdala  in  depressive
disorder.
The amygdala deficit in depression is in line with the prominent theoretical reviews, as
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we have reviewed in the background section. To summarize, Mayberg (1997), DeRubeis et al.
(2008), Disner et al., (2011), and Roiser and Sahakian (2013) in complementing reviews have
suggested that  limbic brain areas,  including the amygdala,  are  hyperactive in  depression.
Higher cortical areas, including the DLPFC, are, on the other hand, hypoactive.
With  regard  to  dopaminergic  neurotransmission,  as  we  have  overviewed  previously,
several reviews have suggested deficits mainly in the mesolimbic dopamine pathway (Nestler
and Carlezon, 2006; Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007; Pizzagalli, 2014).  We consider dopamine
transmission a contributory factor for generating the emotional Stroop effect in the current
model,  and  hence  suggest  that  dopamine  deficits  might  be  relevant  for  the  effects  of
depression at the task.
Drawing on the  evidence  overviewed above,  we hypothesized  that  a  combination  of
parameter  changes  in  the  conditioned  processing  (amygdala),  reinforcement  prediction
(dopamine release) and task-set (PFC) units and connections could account for the pattern of
depressive  performance  at  the  Stroop  tasks.  Appendix  II  outlines  the  set  of  parameters
investigated to reproduce the depressively abnormal Stroop performance. Our aim has been
to identify the simplest combination of parameter changes which closely replicates the pattern
of  behavioural  deficits,  and is  most  consistent  with the neural  mechanisms of  depressive
illness. We have hence given priority to the combinations which involved the lowest number
of parameters and included at least one of the parameters governing the  PEn  conditioned
processing  unit  activation.  This  constraint  was  aimed  to  mimic  the  well-supported
hyperactivity of the amygdala.
MODELLING RESULTS
Classical Stroop Effect Account
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Similarly  to  the  previous  connectionist  accounts,  the  parametrized  model  accounts
relatively well for the classical Stroop effect (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et al., 2006). Figure 2
shows performance of the model compared to  the experimental Stroop effect.  A possible
limitation  is  in  the  quantitative  match  of  colour-naming  response  time  in  the  congruent
condition – the model predicts a shorter response time than reported experimentally. This
limitation, however, is also characteristic of the previous models (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et
al., 2006; Wyble et al., 2008). To additionally confirm the functional significance of the task-
set units, the model was run with these units disabled (input bias set to zero) – this resulted in
incorrect model performance with no response generated at neutral and incongruent trials at
either of the tasks.
To check if the model is able to account for the classical Stroop neuroimaging results of
Banich  et  al.,  (2000,  2001),  average  colour  and  colour-word  processing  unit  activations
across all trial cycles in each condition during the colour naming task were computed. The
results are illustrated in Figure 3 and show that the pattern of neuroactivations predicted by
the model qualitatively matches the neuroimaging reports. Higher activation can be observed
in the word-processing layer (verbal cortical area) in incongruent, compared to congruent and
neutral trials. This is in line with the model of Herd et al. (2006) (Figure 3-C). The model can
be considered a simplification of the TEB account by Herd and colleagues. In particular, the
general  concept  of  colour  from the TEB account  is  replaced by the connection from the
colour-naming task-set unit to the two colour-word units in the word-processing layer (Figure
1, connection TcPw). This is consistent with the notion that the general concept of colour, as
suggested by Herd et al., is recruited as part of the colour-naming task-set in the constructed
model.
To additionally confirm utility of the  TcPw  connection, the model was simulated with
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this  connection  disabled.  The  model  still  produced  correct  responses,  but  no  longer
reproduced the classical Stroop effect – response times at incongruent and neutral conditions
appeared  similar.  The  neuroactivations  effect  illustrated  in  Figure  3  could  no  longer  be
reproduced – average activations of the word-processing units appeared similar in the neutral
and incongruent conditions. These results support the theory of Herd et al.  (2006), which
suggests that task-related information processing is facilitated in all dimensions, including
those which may not be relevant for the task (i.e. colour-related information in verbal areas).
Emotional Stroop Effect Account
The specified model can account for the experimentally reported slow emotional Stroop
effect, occurring at both colour-naming and word-reading tasks.
To replicate  the carry-over  slow emotional  Stroop effect,  we simulated the model  in
accordance with the experimental conditions of McKenna and Sharma (2004).  An array of
consecutive colour-naming trials was executed, where the first trial word was negative, while
the following trial words were neutral.  Results of the sequence simulation may be seen in
Figure  4.  Experimental  response  times  were  extracted  and replotted  from McKenna  and
Sharma (2004), Experiment 3, Figure 1. As can be noted from Figure 4, the model accounts
relatively well for the between-trial slow-down effect of a single negative word presentation.
The modelled colour-naming response time at the trial immediately following the negative-
word trial (first in the sequence) is significantly slower than at the trials from the sequence
with no negative words (Figure 4B, Trial 2, 975 ms vs. 920 ms).
Algom et al. (2004) showed that when negative and neutral word trials are presented in
blocks, the emotion-related response delay effect extends not only to the colour-naming task,
but  also  to  the  word-reading  task.  Depending  on  the  experimental  conditions,  the  delay
observed for  blocked negative  words  at  word-reading appeared  just  as  high  as  at  colour
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naming.  To replicate  these  results,  the  model  was  simulated  at  colour  naming and word
reading with the trials  presented in  blocks.  The resulting mean simulated response times
compared  to  the  original  experimentally  reported  data  are  presented  in  Figure  5.  The
specified model accounts well for the effect of negative words at colour-naming in blocks of
trials.  For word-reading,  the model  accounts for the significant  slow-down with negative
words, but the predicted effect is slightly lower than experimentally reported (Figure 5, word-
reading task, approx. 25 ms modelled versus approx. 35 ms experimental). The model thus
replicates the blocked emotional Stroop effect, but predicts a higher magnitude of the effect at
the colour-naming task compared to word-reading. This is in a slight contrast to the results
reported by Algom et al. (2004), which indicate comparable effects in both tasks.
To summarize, the model accounts well for the emotional Stroop effect both in sequence
of  mixed  words  (Figure  4,  McKenna  and  Sharma,  2004),  and  when negative  words  are
presented  in  blocks  (Figure  5,  Algom  et  al.,  2004).  The  model  thus  captures  both  the
emotional reaction-time slow-down and its predominantly slow between-trial  nature (Phaf
and Kan, 2007).
Depression Modelling Results
Alteration in no single model parameter, from those selected as relevant for depression
(Appendix  II),  could  account  for  the  entire  pattern  of  depressive  deficits.  During  further
exploration, we assumed that an alteration in at least one of the three parameters governing
activation of the conditioned processing unit (IPe, conditioned unit input connection strength;
Eb,  conditioned unit  input  bias;  or  the  conditioned unit  output  gain)  must  be  present  in
depression.  Increase  in  either  of  these  parameters  could  be  considered  representative  of
hyperactivity of the amygdala.
Touples  of  parameter  alterations  were  explored  with  the  above  constraint.  Results
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revealed one simple plausible combination involving alteration of two parameters: increased
tonic activity in the conditioned processing unit (Eb increase from zero to a moderate value),
and increase in inhibitory connection strength between the conditioned processing unit and
the  reinforcement  unit  (Per connection  strength  increase).  This  corresponds  to  moderate
baseline  hyperactivity  of  the  amygdala  and stronger  inhibition  of  mesocortical  dopamine
release in depression. Specific details of the depressive parameter alterations can be found in
Appendix II. An illustration of the identified depression mechanism is highlighted in bold red
in Figure 1.
The  identified  depressive  mechanism  (Eb  input  increase;  Per connection  strength
increase) could generally replicate the slow-downs at the Stroop tasks. Highest slow-down is
observed at the negative condition, followed by the incongruent condition, and then neutral
condition (Figure 6). This is in line with the meta-analytic results by Epp et al. (2012). Epp
and  colleagues  reported  a  highly  significant  Hedges'  g  value  of  0.98 for  the  effect  of
depression in the negative-word Stroop condition (basing on 19 studies), followed by 0.86 for
incongruent condition (basing on 14 studies), and  0.81 for neutral condition (basing on 17
studies).  Hedges'  g  is  a  standardized  effect  size  measure  computed  by  normalizing  the
difference between sample means with a corrected measure of the pooled standard deviation
(Durlak,  2009).  For qualitative comparison of effect sizes between conditions, the simple
absolute  mean  difference  between  participant  samples  (depression  and  control)  could  be
considered equivalent to the Hedges'  g (or other standardized effect sizes) – drawing on an
assumption  that  the  pooled  standard  deviations  are  very  close  or  similar  between  all
conditions.  This  could  be  considered  a  generally  reasonable assumption for  experimental
conditions of the Stroop and emotional Stroop tasks. In terms of condition mean differences
between samples,  the  modelled  depression  mechanism generated  the  following simulated
effects (in cycles): 108 in negative-word condition; 84 in incongruent condition; followed by
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51 in neutral condition, and 21 in congruent condition. These results are qualitatively in line
with the meta-analytic  report  by Epp et  al.  (2012),  but  also predict  a  small  effect  at  the
congruent condition.
Figure 7 illustrates how the model performance compares against the experimental data
for the classical Stroop task in depression. Holmes and Pizzagalli (2008) have reported that
depression  was  associated  with  significantly  slower  response  times  at  the  incongruent,
compared to the congruent condition. The depression model can replicate these results. The
quantitative aspect of this fit, however, should not be taken too strongly. The authors only
report behavioural results for two experimental Stroop conditions in their study: congruent
and incongruent. With only two metrics and two parameters inferred for translating simulated
response  times  from  model  cycles  to  milliseconds  (regression  coefficient  and  intercept,
Equation 4), there is a risk of over-fitting the regression model. These results should be taken
as  an  illustration  of  a  qualitative  fit  of  the  model  to  the  depressive  performance  at  the
classical Stroop task, as well as an illustration of the potential of the model to quantitatively
fit depression behavioural data.
With regard to the emotional Stroop task, the model performance was compared to the
behavioural  results  reported  by  Mitterschiffthaler  et  al.  (2008).  Mitterschiffthaler  and
colleagues  have  not  reported  a  significant  difference  between  depression  and  control
performance  at  the  neutral-word  condition,  despite  a  trend  towards  slower  responses.
Depressed participants in the study have shown significantly slower responses to negative
words, compared to controls. Figure 8 illustrates performance of the model compared to these
results. The model qualitatively replicates the response time increase in the negative-word
condition in depression. As previously, these results should not be taken as a strong claim of a
good quantitative fit to the depressive behavioural data, due to only two reported control
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experimental conditions (negative-word and neutral-word) modelled to derive the regression
parameters. Compared to the results by Mitterschiffthaler and colleagues, the model predicts
a significant depressive slow-down at the neutral condition – in line with the meta-analysis
results (Epp et al., 2012).
To  check  how each  of  the  two  depressive  alterations  contributes  to  the  behavioural
effects,  we  simulated  them  separately.  Results  revealed  that  both  deficits  (hyperactive
amygdala and increased inhibitory influence of the amygdala over the VTA) are responsible
for the increase in response times at the neutral and incongruent conditions. Output generated
by the tonically hyperactive  PEn  unit (amygdala) propagates to the task-set and results in
weaker influence of the  Tc colour-naming task unit over task-related processing (PCr and
PCg), resulting in response delays. This is, however, only possible when the Per connection
strength is  increased (DA release from the VTA is sufficiently inhibited),  which warrants
decreased task-set  output  gains  and enables  the amygdalar  signal  to  propagate.  Only the
increased  Per connection strength, on the other hand, appeared responsible for the higher
response times at the negative-word colour-naming trials, with little effect from the tonically
hyperactive  PEn unit. The stronger  Per connection decreases DA release specifically when
negative words are present, and thus increases influence of negative words over the task-set
stability.
Exploration  of  the  parameter  space  revealed  that  several  other  simple  deficit
combinations could also replicate the depressive behavioural effects. Specifically, hyperactive
amygdala  and  either  the  decreased  reinforcement  unit  output  gain,  the  decreased
reinforcement unit input bias, or the decreased dopaminergic connection from reinforcement
to  task-set,  could  also  replicate  the  effects.  These  alternative  mechanisms,  however,  all
appeared  less  biologically  relevant  to  depression  than  the  main  identified  combination.
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Details  of the alternative mechanisms are described in Appendix II.  We briefly  overview
them,  and  highlight  evidence  favouring  the  main  identified  combination  below  in  the
discussion section.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Modelled Mechanisms of the Emotional Stroop Effect
Neurobiological Correlates
The constructed  model  is  largely  neurobiologically-driven and  is  consistent  with  the
existing neuroimaging evidence indicating activation of the amygdala at the emotional Stroop
task (Isenberg et al., 1999), as well as evidence of the amygdala activation in response to
negative emotional words (e. g. Hamann and Mao, 2002; Naccache et al., 2005; Straube et
al., 2011).
Whalen et al. (1998) and Mohanty et al. (2007) reported activation of the rACC at the
emotional  Stroop trials.  Our  model  does  not  explicitly  account  for  the  rACC activation,
however  two  interpretations  can  be  given.  Namely,  the  rACC  could  either  be  involved
directly  in  generation  of  the  emotional  Stroop  effect,  or  recruited  as  a  compensatory
mechanism to maintain correct performance in the face of affective distraction (as suggested
e. g. in Mohanty et al., 2007). In the first case, the rACC could in part be represented by the
Tn negative-concept unit in our model – providing competition with the task representation
(Tc unit) in the DLPFC, and generating the slow effect. The second case – suggestion of a
compensatory role of the rACC – is consistent with the evidence of involvement of the rACC
in resolving emotional conflict and inhibiting the amygdala (e. g. Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et
al.,  2008).  In the second case,  the rACC would not  contribute directly  to generating the
emotional Stroop effect and could hence be left safely outside of the scope of our model.
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We suggest that propagation of conditioned information to higher cortical areas results in
competition  between  representations  of  the  current  task-set  and  the  concepts  related  to
conditioned information. We do not specify where exactly in the PFC this competition might
take place, however some existing theories provide an indication. Badre (2008) has proposed
that the PFC is organized in a rostro-caudal hierarchy – with more anterior regions containing
progressively more abstract representations of contexts and goals. In our model, conditioned
information competition could occur in the more rostral, abstract concept-related areas of the
PFC, with subsequent destabilizing effects over the more caudal prefrontal areas, including
the  DLPFC,  which  hold  specific  behavioural  task-set  representations.  OFC has  been
suggested  to  extract  and  store  valuation  associated  with  conditioned  information  (e.  g.
Holland and Gallagher, 2004; Frank and Claus, 2006). MPFC has been suggested to have a
role in selection of appropriate actions (e. g. Frank et al., 2009). Drawing on the reported
connectivity of the amygdala (Carmichael and Price, 1995; Ray and Zald, 2012), it is possible
that conditioned information is primarily propagated to the OFC and the MPFC, where it
triggers conflict  between higher-level context representations. Effects  of this conflict  may
then  propagate  to  more  caudal  task-related  areas,  which  results  in  task  deactivation  and
behavioural slow-downs.
Computational Modelling Accounts
The earliest connectionist account of the emotional Stroop effect has been proposed by
Matthews and Harley (1996). The authors suggested that the slow-down effect arises due to
excitatory facilitation of affective information processing, which results in the task-related
response interference – similar to the classical Stroop effect. The early model by Matthews
and Harley does not account for the predominantly slow inter-trial nature of the emotional
Stroop  effect  (McKenna  and  Sharma,  2004;  Phaf  and  Kan,  2007).  No  interpretation  is
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considered by the authors as to how the excitatory facilitation of the emotional and threat-
related information might be implemented in  the brain.  This  is  in contrast  to our model,
which explains the slow effect and is neurobiologically driven.
From the perspective of motivational significance of the  slow emotional Stroop effect,
our model is conceptually consistent with the previous account by Wyble et al. (2008). Wyble
et al. suggest that the slow effect occurs due to deallocation of cognitive resources away from
the current colour-naming task in order to deal with the negative-word signalled threat. Our
model supports this notion; however we suggest that cognitive task-set resources are more
specifically reallocated towards processing negative material, rather than simply freed from
all tasks (decreased cognitive control) as suggested by Wyble and colleagues.
The distinct advantage of our model over the previous accounts is that we specifically
consider  the  neural  mechanisms  of  conditioned  stimuli  processing  in  generating  the
emotional Stroop effect. Wyble and colleagues suggest a neurobiological interpretation which
implicates competition between the rACC (emotional monitoring) and the dACC (cognitive
control) in generation of the slow effect. The authors note that this is disputable since little
direct evidence of such competition has been reported. In contrast, we suggest that the slow
effect  is  generated  due  to  propagation  of  negative  conditioned  information  from  limbic
(amygdala) to higher cognitive areas (PFC), which is generally neurobiologically plausible.
Our computational model is constructed with several simplifications which are worth
mentioning. First of all, we do not precisely model phasic (time-limited) dopaminergic dip
signals observed in neurobiology. The model rather presents a simplified notion of amygdala-
induced  decrease  in  dopaminergic  neurotransmission.  Existing  investigations  show  that
phasic dopaminergic neurotransmission is contingent upon presentation of the CS with the
fast-onset dips lasting over a second (e. g. Mileykovskiy and Morales, 2011; Oleson et al.,
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2012).  Response  times  in  the  emotional  Stroop  task  are  usually  below one  second.  For
simplicity, we have modelled phasic dopamine dips to have an effect over an entire following
trial,  and left  a more detailed account of these signals safely outside of the scope of our
current model.
In the study, the single set of model parameters was able to account for both the classical
and  emotional  Stroop  effects.  It  can  be  noted,  however,  that  regression  and  intercept
parameters of our model (Equation 4) vary between the simulated experiments (Figures 2, 4-
5,  7-8).  This  accounts  for  cognitive  processing  differences  in  different  experimental
conditions. Differences in the regression parameter K are representative of differences in the
speed of processing within the connectionist architecture (Figure 1), while differences in the
intercept parameters I are representative of the different amounts of time necessary for visual
preprocessing  and  motor  mechanics.  Variability  in  the  intercept  parameters  between
conditions is generally plausible, with values ranging between 380 and 490 ms across the five
modelled  experiments.  Regression  and  intercept  variability  is  also  characteristic  of  the
previous account of Wyble et al. (2008). Although we specified each parameter with sensible
constraints,  reasonable  variations  are  highly  plausible  and  would  likely  correspond  to
individual biological or behavioural differences.
Our model serves mainly as a proof of principle that neural mechanisms of conditioned
stimuli processing can account for the behavioural emotional Stroop effect. We suggest that
emotional  words  serve  as  negatively  conditioned  stimuli,  and  hence  that  mechanisms  of
conditioned  stimuli  processing  could  be  responsible  for  the  reaction-time  slow-downs.
Because our model is a simplified computational bridge between the neural mechanisms and
behaviour, the model fits provide proof that, in principle, this is possible. We believe that
these results offer a new perspective on the mechanisms behind the emotional Stroop effect,
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which could guide future investigations with both healthy and clinical participants.
Experimental Predictions
Our  theoretical  account  makes  several  predictions.  We  consider  negative  emotional
words a case of conditioned stimuli. This implies that response delays at the emotional Stroop
task could be reproducible when negative words are replaced with experimentally aversively
conditioned stimuli. To test this prediction, experimental participants could first undergo a
conditioning procedure – with neutral stimuli paired with aversive shocks (e. g. as in Raio et
al.,  2012),  or  paired  with  instrumental  responses  to  avoid  shocks.  These  same  (now
conditioned)  stimuli  could  then  be  used  instead  of  words  at  the  colour-naming task.  We
predict that response delay effects should occur with both aversively conditioned stimuli and
with negative words.
Secondly, we suggest that the emotional Stroop delay effect depends crucially on the
dopaminergic decrease signals reaching the PFC. We thus predict that tonically increasing
dopamine levels in the PFC, for example through administration of dopamine degradation
inhibitor tolcapone (e. g. as in Kayser et al., 2012), should decrease the impact of the dip
signals and counteract the effect – either decreasing or eliminating occurrence of the reaction
time slow-downs.
Finally, we suggest that the slow emotional Stroop effect is dependent on propagation of
conditioned information to the prefrontal cortical areas – likely the MPFC and the OFC – to
facilitate  reallocation  of  cognitive  resources  from the  current  task.  We  thus  predict  that
negative-word  time-locked  excitatory  stimulation  of  these  areas,  through  application  of
anodal transcranial  direct current stimulation (TDCS, e.  g. Bellaiche et  al.,  2013), should
enhance  representations  of  conditioned  information  and  increase  the  delay  effects  at  the
emotional Stroop trials. Inhibitory cathodal stimulation, should, on the other hand, impair
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propagation of conditioned information and ameliorate the delay effects.
Modelled Mechanisms of Depressive Task-set Interference
In the current investigation of mechanisms at play at the Stroop tasks in depression, we
broadly followed the  deductive approach as termed by Maia and Frank in their review of
computational  psychiatry  and neurology modelling  methods  (Maia and Frank,  2011).  We
constructed a connectionist model of normal performance at the Stroop tasks and specified it
to explain the hallmark behavioural findings (Figures 2-5). We then investigated alterations
which are most relevant for depressive disorder and introduced a simple mechanism which
could generally account for the effects of depression at the tasks (Figures 6-8) – hyperactive
amygdala  and  stronger  functional  inhibitory  influence  of  the  amygdala  over  the  VTA
dopamine neurons. To our knowledge this is the first explicit mechanistic theoretical account
of depressive performance at the classical and emotional Stroop tasks. Given the reported
correlation between the symptom severity and the response time effects in depression (Epp et
al.,  2012),  these  mechanistic  deficits  could  be  highly  relevant  to  the  symptoms  of  the
disorder.
Several neuroimaging studies have linked depressive hyperactivity of the amygdala to
rumination  (Cooney et al.,  2010; Mandell et al., 2014). In our model of depression, tonic
amygdalar  hyperactivity triggers persistent  competition for resources in the PFC between
conditioned  negative  information  and  task  representations.  This  could  be  interpreted  as
representative of ruminative processes in the disorder. The novelty of our investigation is
therefore that we suggest a mechanistic link between depressive ruminative processes and
executive  deficits  at  the  classical  Stroop  task.  Several  previous  behavioural  studies  also
support the assertion that depressive rumination might be linked to executive deficits (e. g.
Watkins and Brown, 2002; Levens et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2010).
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When we explored the depression-relevant parameter space we were able to replicate the
depressive reaction-time effects with other simple combinations that included the amygdalar
hyperactivity  (Appendix  II).  Existing  experimental  evidence,  however,  favours  the  main
selected mechanism. Increased gain of the reinforcement unit (first alternative mechanism,
Appendix II) could be considered representative of higher responsiveness to rewards in the
dopaminergic  system.  Existing  evidence,  however,  indicates  that  reward  encoding  is
decreased in main dopamine targets including the OFC and the striatum, while the dopamine
transmission  is  likely  decreased  (Pizzagalli,  2014).  Significantly  decreased  dopaminergic
connectivity from the VTA to the PFC (second alternative mechanism, Appendix II) would
indicate white-matter tract abnormalities between the two regions, however little evidence of
such deficits in depression has been reported. Finally, decreased baseline VTA activity during
task performance (third alternative) could be a plausible alternative mechanism mediating
dopamine deficits  in depression.  Available  experimental  evidence,  however,  indicates that
decreased dopamine transmission is likely mediated by an active inhibition process rather
than internal VTA factors. Tye et al. (2013), for example, directly optogenetically inhibited
midbrain dopamine neurons, which reproduced depression-related behaviours in rats. Tanaka
et al. (2012) reported that attenuation of the VTA dopamine neurons in depression-susceptible
mice is  likely mediated by enhanced VTA inhibitory inputs,  due to  increased levels  of a
specific  bioactive  lipid  –  prostaglandin  E2.  Chang and  Grace  (2014)  have  also  reported
decreased activity of dopamine neurons in a rat model of depression. Crucially, this deficit
was reversed by pharmacologically attenuating activity of either the ventral pallidum (VP) or
the basolateral amygdala (BLA). Further, pharmacological activation of the BLA decreased
dopamine  neuron  activity  in  control  rats.  Chang  and  Grace  suggested  that  depressive
behaviour  could  be  mediated  by  inhibition  of  the  VTA dopamine  neurons  by  the  BLA,
mediated by the intermediary VP structure. Altogether, these experimental results provide a
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compelling  argument  favouring  the  main  selected  depression  mechanism  over  the  three
possible alternatives.
Mitterschiffthaler  et  al.  (2008)  have  reported  stronger  activation  of  the  rACC  in
depression  during  performance of  the  emotional  Stroop task.  The authors  suggested  that
hyperactive  rACC  could  represent  a  compensatory  mechanism  –  suppressing  emotional
processing in the amygdala. If this is indeed the case, we do not explain hyper-activation of
the rACC at the task since we only consider mechanisms which are directly  involved in
generating  the  task  interference  effects.  Alternatively,  the  rACC  might  be  involved  in
propagation of negative conditioned information towards higher cognitive processing. In this
case, stronger activation of the negative concept (Tn) unit due to tonic conditioned signals in
our model might in part be representative of the rACC hyperactivity.
In the model we focus on the effects  of negative words because negative and threat
words are most widely used in the emotional Stroop paradigm (Phaf and Kan, 2007). Epp et
al. (2012), however, also reported a significant reaction time slow-down with positive words
in depression (Hedges' g of 0.87). This effect was higher than with neutral words (Hedges' g
of 0.81), but lower than with negative words (Hedges' g of 0.98). Although we do not provide
an explicit account, we suggest that this effect could be due to the same neural mechanisms.
Specifically, positive words could still be processed by the amygdala (as conditioned stimuli),
but would not trigger dopamine dips, which would limit their behavioural effect in healthy
participants. In depression, decreased dopamine transmission would enable the positive-word
signals to propagate to the PFC, which would result in task-set competition and response
delays. Because of a lack of added dopamine dip signals with positive words, however, these
delays would be lower than with the negative words, but higher than with neutral words, as
reported in Epp et al. (2012).
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Drawing  on  the  modelled  depression  mechanism,  we  make  several  experimentally
testable  predictions.  We suggest  that  the  amygdala exhibits  stronger  inhibitory  functional
influence  over  the  VTA in  depression.  This  is  directly  testable  through  dynamic  causal
modelling  (DCM)  –  a  technique  used  successfully  to  investigate  functional  interactions
between brain regions  (Etkin et  al.,  2006;  Friston et  al.,  2003;  Friston  2009).  Depressed
patients should exhibit stronger inhibition of the VTA by the amygdala compared to controls
– either at rest, or during task performance in the scanner. Because of the tonically inhibited
dopamine transmission, the model also predicts that the depressed participants should exhibit
a small  fast  (same-trial) emotional Stroop effect alongside the increased  slow between-trial
response delay, due to potentiated processing of negative material.
Conclusion and Further Investigations
We have proposed a novel integrative model of the mechanisms at play when generating
the classical and emotional Stroop effects. Our theory is based on the novel interpretation of
emotional  words  as  a  specific  case  of  conditioned stimuli.  We grounded the  model  with
aspects of neurobiology involved in conditioned stimuli processing. We suggest that the slow
between-trial emotional Stroop effect is mediated by dopamine decrease signals, which reach
the  PFC  and  enable  the  amygdala-initiated  competition  for  resources.  We  suggest  that
depressive deficits in the Stroop tasks might be caused by the hyperactive amygdala and the
increased  functional  inhibitory  influence  of  the  amygdala  over  dopaminergic
neurotransmission.  Due  to  the  reported  correlation  between  depression  severity  and  task
performance (Epp et al., 2012), we suggest that these proposed mechanisms might be highly
relevant  for  understanding  depressive  illness.  We  believe  that  these  results  offer  a  new
perspective on the mechanisms of the emotional Stroop effect in health and in depression,
which could lead future investigations. We offered several experimental predictions, testable
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though  behavioural,  cortical  stimulation,  pharmacological  and  neuroimaging  methods  –
future  studies  will  test  and  prove  or  disprove  aspects  of  our  theory  and  the  suggested
depression mechanisms.
One particular avenue for both theoretical and experimental future investigations is the
role of the rACC at the emotional Stroop task. Existing neuroimaging studies have shown
activation of the region when performing the task (Whalen et al., 1998; Bush et al., 2000;
Mohanty  et  al.,  2007),  and Mitterschiffthaler  et  al.  (2008) have  reported  hyperactivity  at
negative-word trials in depression. Future studies should better explain the functional role of
this region and might indicate whether its hyperactivation at negative word trials is relevant
for symptomatology of depression.
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APPENDIX I  |  Model Parametrization
Model unit activation parameters are briefly described in Table A1. Input bias Ib and Tb
parameters are constrained to the value 1 at the trial-relevant task unit and the trial-relevant
input units. The canonical value of 1 follows from the fact that output of a single unit is
constrained  between  zero  and  one  (Figure  A1).  Eb  is  always  zero  for  control  (healthy)
participant simulations.  All  other units  do not receive external inputs from outside of the
model. Time constant of unit activations has been fixed to the value τ = 0.025  for all units,
although  this  is  not  principal  for  the  model  performance.  Response  threshold  has  been
constrained  to  RTh = 0.75 ,  representing  a  high  response  unit  activation  necessary  for
response  generation.  All  input,  processing  and  response  unit  output  gains  were  set  to
γP = 6 , which represents an intermediate gain – resulting in neither highly thresholded,
nor linear input-output neural function, likely characteristic of average neural populations in
the brain (Figure A1). Conditioned and reinforcement (PEn and PR) unit gains were set to a
higher value γC = 8 , representing a biologically-viable high responsiveness of these units
to conditioned input signals. Reinforcement unit input bias was set to  Rb = 0.65 , which
results  in  relatively  high  (but  not  maximal)  output  of  the  unit  during  the  task.  This  is
considered to represent relatively high dopaminergic stimulation of the PFC to maintain the
task-set  during  performance.  Minimal  output  gain  of  the  task-set  units  was  specified  to
γTmin = 0.5 . This results in almost linear relationship between inputs and outputs for task-
set units, with small maximal outputs (e. g. Figure A1), simulating low PFC activation, and
thus low lateral competition when no dopaminergic stimulation is present.
Output of each unit is driven by its activation (a) and defined by the following equation:
o j ,t =
1
1 + e−γi (Sai , t−1 − θ)
− d (3)
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In the above equation,  θ = 1  and  S = 2  fixed for all  units.  This constrains unit
outputs to lie between zero and one and forces unit output to zero when no unit input is
present (Figure A1).
Unit  output is  dependent on the unit  gain ( γ ),  which is  representative of dopamine
levels for task-set (PFC) units (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990;  Cohen and Servan-Schreiber,
1993; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1998; Braver et al., 1999). Figure A1 illustrates effect of the γ
parameter over the unit output function. As can be noted from Figure A1, high unit  gain
results in lower outputs at low activations (e. g.  γ = 8 , activation below 0.5), but higher
maximal output ( γ = 8 , activation above 0.8). Lower gain, on the other hand, results in
higher unit outputs at low activations, but lower outputs at higher activations, with lower
maximal  output  ( γ = 2 ).  Lower  gain  thus  increases  outputs  of  less  active  units  and
decreases outputs of highly active units. This promotes competition between newly-activated
(e. g. Tn) and already highly active units (e. g. Tc) when they are inhibitorily interconnected.
Negative conditioned stimuli in our model lead to decreased gain of the task-set (PFC) units –
which we suggest facilitates competition – activation of the negative-concept (Tn) unit and
deactivation of the current task-set (e. g. Tc) unit.
Model connection parameters are briefly described in Table A2.  Constraints applied to
specify the model connection parameters are described in the main methods section of the
report. The specified model connection parameters are presented in Table A3.
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APPENDIX II  |  Depression Model
Parameters of units and connections responsible for task-set and conditioned stimulus
processing have been considered as relevant for depression and explored to identify the most
depression-relevant mechanism.
Input biases: Tb, Rb, Eb.
Output gains: τE  (output gain of the PEn unit), τR  (output gain of the PR unit).
Connection strengths: IPe, PTe, Per, Rt.
Alteration  in  no  single  parameter  could  account  for  the  entire  pattern  of  depressive
behavioural deficits.
Primary identified simple depression mechanism:
1. Increase in conditioned processing unit input bias Eb from zero to 0.615 (amygdala
hyperactivity);
2. Increase in conditioned processing to reinforcement prediction connection strength
Per  from  -0.25  to  -0.33  (increase  in  amygdala  inhibitory  influence  over
dopaminergic transmission).
Alternative identified  mechanisms  with  the  amygdalar  hyperactivity  resulting  in
equivalent depressive behavioural deficits:
(1) Increase in Eb from zero to 0.63 and increase in reinforcement prediction unit output
gain τR  from 8 to 14.5 (stronger VTA responsiveness to input);
(2)  Increase  in  Eb  from  zero  to  0.59  and  decrease  in  connection  strength  from
reinforcement prediction to task-set Rt from 8 to 2.5 (weak VTA to PFC connectivity);
(3) Increase in Eb from zero to 0.60 and decrease in reinforcement prediction unit input
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bias Rb from 0.65 to 0.57 (lower baseline VTA activity);
We  consider  the  primary identified  mechanism  most  plausible  due  to  its  highest
relevance to the neurobiology of depression. Experimental evidence favouring the primary
identified depression mechanism over the alternatives is briefly overviewed in the discussion
section.
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Table A1
Model unit activation parameters
Parameter Description
  Ib Input unit input bias parameter (fixed)
  Tb Task-set unit input bias parameter (fixed for control simulations)
  Rb Reinforcement prediction unit input bias
  Eb Conditioned processing unit input bias (zero for control simulations)
τ Time constant of all neural units
γP Output gain of all input, processing and response units
γC Output gain of the conditioned processing units (PEn and PR)
γTmin Minimal output gain of the task-set units
  RTh Response threshold of the model
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Table A2
Model connection parameters
Parameter Description
  IPc Colour input to processing connection strength
  PRc Colour processing to response connection strength
  TS Training scale parameter (IPw = IPc x TS and PRw = PRc x TS)
  IPe Negative word input to conditioned processing connection strength
  PTe Conditioned processing to task-set (negative concept) connection strength
  Per Conditioned processing to reinforcement prediction inh. connection strength
  r T Reinforcement prediction influence scale
  Li Lateral inhibitory connections strength
  TcP Colour-naming task to colour-processing connection strength
  TcPw Colour-naming task to word-processing (PWr, PWg) connection strength
  TwP Word-reading task to word-processing connection strength
  TwR Word-reading task to response connection strength
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Table A3
Specified model connection parameters
Parameter IPc PRc TS IPe PTe Per r T Li TcP TcPw TwP TwR
Value 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 - 0.25 8.0 - 0.8 0.75 0.33 1.1 0.3
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Figure  1.  Conditioned  Task-set  Competition  model  architecture.  Arrows  represent  excitatory
connections. Circled arrows represent inhibitory connections. Solid lines represent model connections.
Dashed lines represent model inputs and outputs. Depressive mechanism (highlighted in bold red):
Increased  tonic  input  to  the  conditioned  processing  unit  (amygdala),  and  increased  strength  of
inhibitory  connection  from  the  conditioned  processing  unit  to  the  reinforcement  prediction  unit.
Abbreviations: PFC – prefrontal cortex; VTA – ventral tegmental area; DA – dopamine.
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Figure  2.  Model  replication  of  the  classical  Stroop  interference  effect,  as  reported  in  Dunbar  and
MacLeod 1984, Experiment 2, Figure 3. Response times and standard errors extracted and replotted.
Model regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.82 ms/cycle, I = 398 ms.
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Figure 3. Modelled classical Stroop colour-naming task neuroactivations in word- and 
colour-processing units.
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Figure  4.  Modelled  replication  of  the  slow  emotional  Stroop  (sequence)  effect,  as  reported  in
McKenna and Sharma, 2004, Experiment 3, Figure 1. Only second trial difference between negative-
word sequence and neutral-word sequence response times is significant in the experimental data. The
model predicts the highest significant difference in the second trial (slow effect), but also a smaller,
but  significant  difference  in  the  first  trial  (fast  effect).  Regression  and  intercept  parameters:
K = 3.06 ms/cycle, I = 483 ms.
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Figure 5. Modelled replication of the blocked emotional Stroop effect, as reported in Algom et al. 2004,
Experiment 2, Figure 2. Triple stars indicate highly significant difference (p < 0.001). Colour-naming
was reported significantly slower compared to word-reading (not shown in figure). All differences
between  model  performance  statistics  are  significant  (no  variability  was  modelled).
Regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.15 ms/cycle, I = 476 ms.
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Figure 6. Depression mechanism simulation results. Introduction of the depressive mechanism leads to –
in  the  order  of  absolute  effect  size  –  slower  responses  in  the  negative  condition,  followed  by
incongruent condition, followed by neutral, and finally congruent conditions.
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Figure 7. Modelled replication of the classical Stroop effect in depression, as reported in Holmes and 
Pizzagalli 2008, Table 1A. Double stars indicate high significance (p < 0.01), triple stars indicate 
highest significance (p < 0.001). All modelled condition response time differences are significant (no 
variability has been modelled). Regression and intercept parameters: K = 0.35 ms/cycle, I = 439 ms.
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Figure 8.  Modelled replication of  the  blocked emotional  Stroop effect  in  depression,  as reported in
Mitterschiffthaler et al.,  2008. Response times and standard errors extracted and replotted. Double
stars indicate high significance (p < 0.01), triple stars indicate highest significance (p < 0.001). All
modelled  condition  response  time  differences  are  significant  (no  variability  has  been  modelled).
Regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.31 ms/cycle, I = 383 ms.
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Figure  A1.  Model  unit  output  function  dependency  on  unit  gain  ( γ )  and  unit
activation ( a ).
